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Abstract 
In this paper we develope a framework in which organisation is 
treated as an input in a production firm. The determination of an 
equilibrium organisation input is described. Corresponding to the 
equilibrium a quasi-rent is earned bv the organisation. Improvements 
in efficiency and technological change are regarded as substitution 
of organisation input for labour and capital inputs. 
Development sequences of three tvpes of firms are discussed. 
Eor the large firm in a mature economy, organisation input is primarily 
generated within the firm. Eor the small firm, in a mature econornv, 
entry and exit plav the vital role. ^or the firm in an underdeveloped 
country little organisation input is generated, and there are good 
economic reasons whv the substitution of organisation input for other 
inputs is inefficient. It is a better strategy for an underdeveloped 
country to import organisation inputs (but not organisation stocks) 
when they are needed, because of the relatively low costs of organisatio 
inputs generated in the mature economies. 
, ORGANIZATION INPUT At© EG ONOMC IEVELOPI.1ERT 
T. Y. SHEET* 
I ' 
In the literature the relationship between "firm" and "organization11 
is generally ambiguous. Frequently the.two terms are used interchangeably. 
For examples Mrs. Penrose (a leading figure in the field) had written 
(21.P.305) that "in any economy, the basic unit of"industrial production 
is the firm or the enterprise, for it is the firm that acquires the 
factor of production,, organizes them in the production process, "designs 
the methods of production and the products, and usually surveys markets 
and arrange sales. In particular the firm is- the organization through 
which innovations are put into practice". This usage is misleading. As 
many fruitful studies in recent years (13/17) have shorn, the behavior 
of the firm is significantly affected by its internal structure. The basic 
purpose of the present paper is to establish a framework in which 
organization is recognized specifically as a component of the firm. In 
particular organization is an input the "fourth factor of production" 
of IJarshall. It performs the tasks mentioned by Mrs. Penrose, and is 
entitled to a remuneration like the other inputs. 'Hie' central issue in this 
framework Is to determine the relationship between organization performance 
and organization income. Once this issue is clarified, the role of 
organization in economic development can be analyzed. 
What is organization? As a first approximation and in the context of 
a private enterprise economy, it is the.'team of "non-marginal product 
employees" in a firm, (13), including managers, supervisors and staff 
employees like accountants, engineers and secretaries. This definition 
2. 
must be extended.. An organization should be time-specific with respect 
to the historical development of a firm, because the capability of the 
"team" to perform its tasks depends on how long the team lias worked 
together on these tasks. It also includes the written and unwritten 
constitution, by-laws, rules, codes and habits prevailing in the firm, all 
of which combine to determine the roles of inputs by way of production 
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layout, task definitions, communication channels and decision rules. With 
these extensions a one-to-one correspondence can be established between 
the stock.of. organization at the .beginning of a period and the level of its 
task performance, with given supply of other inputs and given technology. 
Organization input is a flow. A "norm" of organization input may be 
defined as that input which maintains the organization stock of a firm at 
a constant level in a time period. But organizations are by their nature 
2 • -• • dynamic. Individuals on the team grow and the composition of the team 
changes over time. The working relationship- among the team members develops 
and the organization responds to new stimuli provided "by changes in the 
environment. It is therefore more appropriate to define a dynamic norm of 
organization input as that input which keeps the organization stock of a 
firm growing at the average rate for the industry. When organization input 
for a particular firm exceeds this norm, the level of organization performance 
is raised relative to the industry average and its organization stock 
becomes larger. Thus, measured against the norm, organization stock is the 
cumulative sum of past organization inputs. 
The total organization input in an economy is more than the mere sum 
of organization inputs of firms. Even if we- include as firms subsistence 
farms, governments and non-profit institutions, -there-is still much more to 
be included in the organization stock of the economy. Moral tradition, 
laws, informal associations and other social bonds are all part of the 
organization stock. By social interaction new organization inputs are 
incessantly injected into the economy. These inputs can Influence the 
performance level of firms as much as the inputs generated by their own 
organizations. However we will not go beyond the firm organizations in 
this -paper and will simply assume that organization inputs originated 
outside of the firm organizations affect all firms to the same degree. 
Turning to organization income, the differential in performance level 
associated with different organization stocks gives rise to quasi-rent. An 
organization can survive only if it manages some threshold level of task 
performance in the long run. It earns a quasi-rent if its performance 
exceeds the threshold. The coherence of an organization derives from the 
fact that by co-operation the members of an organization can contribute more 
to output than if they work individually. But this is insufficient for the 
survival of an organization. Only when an organization is able to earn a 
3 positive quasi-rent will its owners have a vested interest in keeping it 
going. An on-going organization, of course, has a better chance of 
perpetuating.itself because of the cumulative nature of the organization 
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stock.. There is no need here to distinguish Schumpeter's entrepreneurial 
profit from quasi-rent: the former is a special case of the latter. 
Entrepreneurial profit is incurred when the organization input generates 
something novel, such as a new product or a new production relationship. 
Monopoly profit, on the other hand, is something different and requires 
a new definition in our framework. At times the threshold for quasi-rent 
is raised so high that only a single firm survives in an industry. It 
becomes a monopoly. Quasi-rent based on the organization differential 
between the monopolist and the best-qualified potential entrant would still 
set a limit to profit unless there are other barriers to entry that permit-
monopoly pricing. The excess profit over the quasi-rent (based on the 
organization differential) represents monopoly, profit. The usefulness. 
of this definition will be demonstrated in our empirical analysis in 
Section III. • 
We now come to the meaning of organization performance. It is useful 
to distinguish two types of tasks engaged in by organizations. The.first 
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is growth and technological change, the former a movement-on the 
production surface and the latter a shift of the production surface itself. 
The mechanics of their execution by a firm organization have been ably . 
described by Mrs. Penrose (20). We shall identify the organization stock • 
responsible for this type of task as P-factor. The second type-of task is 
to imp ,/ve X-efficiency, a movement towards the production surface. The 
dynamics here were analyzed in two well-known papers by Leibenstein (12, 13) 
The associated organization stock will accordingly be referred to as L-facto 
Although the distinction between P-factor and L-factor facilitates .' 
our analysis, they are closely related. Typically growth and .technological' 
change require installation of new capital equipment. .This affords a 
chance to break the existing inertia, the basis of X-inefficiency. :Qn the 
other hand the inexperience with the operation of new technologies results 
in new X-efficiency. The demands for P-factor and for L-factor are 
therefore interdependent. On the supply side the saiae- organization provides 
the resources for the build-up of both factors. Parkinson had observed 
that among firms there are two types of organization personalities, male 
6 • ' ' and female, which are parallel to superior endowments of P-factor and 
L-f actor. But a textbook substitution relationship underlies these. 
personalities. X-efficiency has an upper bound defined .by the production 
surface. Technology and growth also have an upper bound determined by the 
state of technical knowledge and the art of management. Diminishing returns 
set in when the supply of either P-factor or L-factor rises. A, balance 
between the factors is established by substitution. Organization 
personalities arise when the supply costs of the two factors vary for 
different firms. 
It is important to stress the superiority of organization in 
comparison to individual entrepreneurs as a eatalyst of change. 
Division of labor and specialization enhance the capabilities of an 
organization. More, information is pooled. Organization behavior also 
tends to be more rational and deliberate (l), even though it may inhibit 
creativity. Dynamically the scope of .growth of an organization is vastly 
greater. An organization has a time horizon beyond that of individuals and 
can absorb new members when needed. This list is by no means complete yet 
it should suffice to demonstrate the greater potential of organizations. 
We will use the concepts Introduced above as the basis of a model In 
the next section. We will show how, under some assumptions, there is a 
tendency for firms to converge towards an equilibrium at the dynamic 
norm of organization input mentioned earlier. The model applies well to 
large firms in a mature economy; for,small firms modifications are needed. 
We then turn to the underdeveloped economies in Section III. With an 
empirical illustration we focus, on the difficulties in generating new 
domestic organization stock. In the final section we analyze the option of 
importing organization stock to underdeveloped economies by way of 
multinational corporations. We conclude that policies to build -up domestic 
organization stock, either directly or through the instrument of 
multinational corporations, are of dubious merit. The direct importation 
of organization input when needed has a higher payoff for countries in 
early stages of economic development. 
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II 
We have defined the organization stock of a firm in terms of the 
level of its performance. Its income is a quasi-rent based on performance 
differential. This provides the center piece of a model that we shall no?/ 
describe in geometric terms. Hie limited supply of organization stock for 
a given firm and the inevitable diminishing returns governing its 
deployment suggest that the model will possess equilibrating properties. 
In a sense then the model represents an extension of leibenstein's 
demonstration of,an X-inefficiency equilibrium. .Alternatively the 
model may be regarded as an attempt to synthesize the theories of 
Mrs. Penrose and leibenstein. 
The assumptions needed for our model include : 
(1) Firms operate in a single-product industry characterized by 
competition. The price of the product is determined in each period by 
demand and supply. Supply is altered over time by growth of firms and 
by entries and exits. 
(2) Each firm possesses a stock of organization and the organization 
"runs" the firm. The decision rule followed by the organization is the 
maximization of the discounted stream of quasi—rents. The same set of 
"complete information" about the future' is accessible to all firms, but the 
costs of obtaining this information varies inversely with the stock of 
organization possessed by a firm. 
(3) Differences in the "routine production" (described by the relationship 
between non-organization inputs and outputs) of firms are attributable to 
their differences in the values of the "decision variables": scale of 
operation, technology and X-efficiency. 
(4) Cardinal indices can be assigned to represent each of the decision 
7 variables. Divisibility Is inplied, so that incremental changes in the 
values of the decision variable are permissible. There is also 
irreversibility: except in the case of exit, the decision variable values 
do not decline. 
(5) Organization input is required to execute changes in the decision 
variable values. In particular a positive monotonic relationship exists 
between organization input and the extent to which decision variable 
values may be raised in a period. 
(6) Expansion (in the scale of operation) requires the installation 
of new capital equipment, and this equipment embodies best-practice 
technology. 
(7) New technology is more capital intensive (24), and hence can be 
adopted only by the installation of new (best practice) capital equipment. 
Technological change may be carried out either by replacement or by 
expansion. 
(8) X-efficiency improvement acts on labor productivity and affects 
capital productivity only because there are substitution and complementarity 
relationships between capital and labor. 
In addition environment must remain unchanged if a firm, starting from 
a point of disequilibrium, is to move towards and ultimately reach an 
equilibrium. The most important environmental constants for our model are: 
(1) the organization stock and the organization input generated by 
the stock as measured against the industry average; 
(2) the rate of change of the best practice technology; and 
(3) consumer demand for the product of the industry assumed to be 
somewhat inelastic. 
We start by considering the role of the P-factor in the replacement 
decision. In Panel (a) of Figure One, the revenue and cost associated 
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with replacement are shown to be functions of the rate of replacement./-
For the profit maximizing firm the optimal replacement rate is at the 
point where the distance between the two functions is at a maximum. The 
position of the revenue and the cost functions for a . iven firm is affected 
by two crucial factors. The first is the "technology gap", or the 
difference in the technology index between the firm in question and the 
best practice technology. Let T* be the technology index''of -the best 
practice technology and T the technology index of the .'firm, then the 
technology gap is T*-T. . A large technology gap implies', the presence of a 
large proportion of inefficient capital equipment•and gain from replacement 
will be greater. Curves I, II and III in Panel (a) depict the replacement' 
revenue function of three different plants in ascending order of 
technology gap. J" : ; 
The replacement cost function shifts with the endowment of P-factorj 
or the capacity of the firm organization to search and perceive profitable 
moves in technological change and then to plan, co-ordinate'knd- execute 
the moves. A rich supply of P-factor lowers the adjustment costs for each ' 
rate of replacement and hence the replacement cost: function. Curves A,"' ' 
B and C in Panel (a) depict the replacement cost functions of three firms 
In descending order of P-factor endowment. 
Panel (b) reiterates the fact that the optimal rate of replacement is'' 
an increasing function of both the technology gap (T*-T.) and the P-factor 
endowment. If firms stay on the optimal replacement curves, then each firm 
will move towards an equilibrium rate of replacement as shown in Panel (c). 
The curves in Panel (c) are transposed from (b) with two modifications. 
The vertical axis now measures the rate of technological change resulting' 
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from replacement, DT^s" 
IT = (T0 - 3L ) 
where T is.' the technology index of a firm in Time Period 2 and T. its 
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technology index in Time Period 1. The subscript r refers to the fact 
that replacement is the source of the technological change« In addition, 
A, B and- G are now time paths"1"0 for firms with different P-factdr 
endowments. 
The relationship illustrated in Panel (c) resembles the ordinary 
adjustment model with DT^ =\(l* - T).11 Each act of replacement affects 
the value of (T* - T) in a subsequent period. Starting from a^, for 
example, the firm will move along the A-curve towards the origin. How 
suppose that the best practice technology itself is changing at a constant 
and exogeneously determined rate DT"*: 
DT* = (T*.- T*) 
where T* and T* are the technology indices of the best practice technology 
in Time Periods 2 and 1 respectively. Then clearly a^ is a stable equilibrium 
point for Pirm A, whose rate of technological change DT^ is the same as 
DT* and whose technology gap (T* - T) remains constant. If all firms are 
in equilibrium, then they all have the same rate of technological change. 
However the rate of technological change will be higher for Pirm A and its 
capital assets will correspondingly be more advanced. Provided that the 
endowments of P-factor for the different firms remain constant, there vail 
be a stable ranking of firms with respect to technology. Depending on 
demand there will be a marginal firm 7/hose technology"is such that it earns 
zero quasi-rent. To the left of the marginal firm larger and larger 
quasi-rents are earned by firms with smaller and smaller technology gaps. 
The model is easily extended to include expansion as an option for the 
deployment of P-factor, Panel (d) is analogous to Panel (a), except that 
the rate of expansion takes the place of the rate of replacement along the 
abscissa. The expansion revenue function and the expansion cost functions 
are defined in the same way as the corresponding replacement functions. 
The expansion revenue function rises with the rate of expansion as the 
cost of production is lowered with the greater proportion of best practice 
technology. The rate of increase diminishes since the demand curve for the 
industry is downward sloping. The expansion cost curve rises at an 
increasing rate because of the fixed P-factor endowment. As before, the 
point of maximum distance between the two functions determines the optimal 
rate of expansion. 
The position of the curves in (d) also depends on the technology gap 
and the P-factor endowment. To,simplify the exposition, firms are assumed 
to be in replacement equilibrium initially. At this equilibrium there is 
a one-to-one correspondence between technology gap and P-factor endowment. 
Firm A has a higher endowment of P-factor than B, yet their rates of 
technological change are the same. It is plausible that the quantity of 
P-factor required for replacement depends on the rate of technological 
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change rather than on the rate of replacement. Consequently Firm A (and 
all firms to the left of the marginal firm) has idle reserve of P-factor 
that may be deployed for expansion. In the meantime. Firm A already enjoys 
a greater familarity with the best practice technology by virtue of its 
higher rate of replacement, so that it needs less P-factor to execute a 
given rate of expansion. This has the direct effect of lowering the 
expansion cost function. If the surplus P-factor is converted to L-factor, 
Firm A can also expect a lower routine operation costs after the 13 
expansion and hence a higher expansion revenue. Talcing the two functions 
together, Firm A will have a higher expansion rate. 
Panel (e) Is akin to Panel (c). The solid curves trace out the time 
path of "total" technological change, DT, the sum of.changes in the 
technology index due to replacement and due to expansion. To illustrate, 
Firm A at replacement equilibrium position , a expands and its rate of total 
technological change is a1."*"^  This brings the firm closer to T* in the 
next period. The rate of replacement declines, increasing the unused 
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P-factor available for more expansion,. Por a number of reasons, however, 
the time path mil move down towards ag. Pirst, it is likely that more 
P-factor is required for the same installation of capital equipment if 
the installation is related to expansion rather than replacement. The 
assimilation of new staff, after all, is- usually more difficult than the 
reassignment of existing staff. Second., for the same installation of 
capital assets expansion entails a smaller change of technology index than 
replacement. ;Third, as a firm moves closer to the ordinate (where T = T*) 
a given installation of capital equipment '(whether for replacement or 
expansion) has, a diminishing impact on its technology index. Finally, 
as a firm continues to expand, the same rate of expansion requires a larger 
installation of capital assets. On the assumption•of fixed P-factor 
endowment, the expansion cost function shifts'upward and lowers the rate of 
optimal expansion.. Por all these reasons, the rate of technological change 
(DT) falls to a , Similarly Pirm B comes to a rest at b and Pirm C at c . e e e 
Pirm A by virtue of its greater P-factor endowment will enjoy a more 
advanced level of technology, a more rapid rate of growth and a higher 
quasi-rent. The rate of change of technology, 011 the other hand, is the 
same for all firms in equilibrium. 
Turning to L-factor, we focus on the routine operation costs of a 
firm with given technology. The conclusions reached by leibenstein 
(12, 13) are quite similar to our findings on technology. There is also 
an equilibrating mechanism which guides the firms towards an equilibrium 
in X-efficiency, .If X-efficiency improves exogeneously as a result of 
organization or management innovations, competition leads to comparable 
increases in. X-eff iciency for all firms. At equilibriums, moreover, there 
is a stable rank ordering of firms in'X-efficiency, corresponding to their 
endowment of L-factor (in our . terminology). 
To combine P-factor and L-factor in a single model, we define a 
productivity index, Z, which is a product of the technology index T and 
an X-efficiency index E. We. further define E in such a way that its 
value runs from 0 to 1.0, with 1.0 referring to production on the efficient 
production frontier. The best productivity index Z* is equal to T*, and 
each firm will be characterized by a productivity gap Z*-Z. 
The dynamics of 1-factor are based on separate "pull" and "push" 
processes. A typical pull process is described by the situation where new 
L-factor input generated by a firm in a time period is proportional to its 
1-factor stock at the beginning of the period. In this case, firms with 
high efficiency and advanced technology initially will iia,Y6 a higher 
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improvement in productivity. ^ The locus of equilibrium points for the 
firms becomes a line with a negative slope instead of the horizontal line 
in Panel (e), leading, to a widening gap between high productivity and low 
productivity firms. This is balanced by the push process, stressing the 
competitive pressure on the less efficient firm to catch up. High efficiency 
and advanced technology initially would result in lower X-efficiency 
i mpr o vemen t. ^  
If the push process is insufficient to offset the destabilizing influence 
of the pull process, equalization of productivity increase may still be 
attained by the interaction between P-factor and L-factor. In particular, 
X-efficiency is likely to decline with installation of new capital 
equipment. Hence firms with a small technology gap tend to have a larger 
X-efficiency gap. Hie neutralization minimizes the impact of the pull 
process. More importantly P-factor may be. converted into L-factor and 
vice versa. Since improvements in X-efficiency are subject to diminishing 
returns, L-factor is converted into P-factor for firms with a small 
efficiency gap, Hie "excess" organization stock can then be channelled 
into expansion, with the result that DZ is approximately equalized for 
all firms. Panel (e) then describes productivity change, with the abscissa 
relabelled Z*~Z and the ordinate relabelled DZ. The equilibrium rate of 
productivity change for all firms is given by the horizontal line at a 
height equal to the product of DT* and DE, the,.average rate of efficiency 
improvement. 
Some of the propositions implied by our model are consistent with 
previous empirical findings on U.S. firms. The innovator firms are fast 
growers (l6) and there is a "distinct relationship between the base year 
technology and the growth performance of manufacturing plants" (22). On 
the other hand our model appears to offer no explanation, for two conspicuous 
phenomena: the paramount importance of entry and exit and the impermanence 
of relative technology ranking of given firms. Of 2686 manufacturing 
plants in a sample, we found (22) that 1617 had exited between 1935 and 
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1959: 60 percent of the initial total. In addition: "technology differenc 
represents one of those persistent but impermanent competitive advantages" 
and "initial competitive advantages by plants with more advanced- technology 
were largely dissipated yd.thin a decade" (22). Obviously we need to 
re-examine the assumptions of our model. 
It is useful to distinguish two development sequences for firms in 
a culture economy. Eor small firms two .important modifications to our model 
must be made. Because small firms have limited capital equipment, the 
divisibility assumption cannot be maintained. In the meantime the small 
stock of organization possessed by a small firm is insufficient to plan, 
install and start up new capital equipment. Instead this task is usually 
performed by the capital equipment manufacturers. Since the initial 
P-factor input is provided from outside, the organization stock of the 
firm no longer bears any relationship to its level of technology, These 
two features completely charge the development sequence of the small firm 
from that predicted by our model. Whatever the organization stock 
possessed by the firm, it earns a high quasi-rent in its early life 
because of its small technology gap. The quasi-rent may be kept up for a 
while with improvements in X-efficiency. Nevertheless, because of the lumpiness 
of capital equipment relative to its total asset, expansion is not a real 
alternative even though the firm is earning high quasi-rents. The lack of 
an opportunity to display its organization capabilities also prevents the 
firm from distinguishing itself in the outside capital market. Subsequently 
its technology gap is widened by obsolescence, while new opportunity to 
improve on its X-efficiency becomes increasingly more limited. The quasi-
rent declines, crosses the zero threshold and the firm expires. This life 
cycle is still further shortened- in many cases by the departure of key 
individuals in the firm organization. The smallness of the'organization 
makes it vulnerable to such'departures. 
This sequence appears to be consistent with the empirical findings 
mentioned earlier. Several features may be noted. First, organization 
has almost no import in the development sequence — - which may well explain 
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why organization -was neglected in the neo-classical theory of the firm. 
Superiority in the organization stock has only a minor impact on quasi-rent. 
Since the.firm could not expand, generation of new organization input is 
also discouraged. Second, entry and exit alone are crucial: new 
technology and improvement in X-efficiency in the economy are both direct 
results of new entries, while' the average productivity is also raised by 
the exit of aged firms. Third, the rate of entry and exit is determined 
by the rate of change of the best practice technology through the 
mechanism of quasi-rent determination. This preserves our conclusion 
that productivity increase in the industry is determined by the rate of 
increase of the best practice technology. 
But our model is by no means irrelevant.• With the organization 
revolution large firms - sometimes created, sometimes formed by merger, 
sometimes by growth of the exceptional small firms - are becoming 
increasingly important in a mature economy, and our model gives a fairly 
realistic description of the large firms. With a large firm the P-factor 
relevant for the planning and installation.of new capital equipment is 
"internalized" because the firm organization is large enough to handle it 
and has a competitive advantage in doing so based -on its intimate knowledge 
of the firm. The P-factor endowment of the firm is therefore responsible 
for the technology gap, just as we have assumed-in the model. The 
lumpiness of capital equipment also loses its significiance: relative to 
the total assets of the firm most capital equipment may be regarded as 
divisible, large quasi-rents earned in a period can be used for 
immediate expansion. Superior P-factor endowment will not remain idle, 
and ample incentive is provided for the generation of new organization 
input. The large organization also has a continuity and a stability. 
With stable stocks of P-factor and 1-factor the firms are likely to 
stay in equilibrium. Por large firms, therefore, organization assumes 
a central role both in productivity increase, and in determining the 
fortunes of the firm. This is true unless the firm turns into a 
monopoly then the situation will be quite similar to the underdeveloped 
economy case to be described in the next section. 
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III 
As the catalyst of technological change and efficiency improvement;, 
organization input is at the heart of economic development. But what type 
of organization .input is needed? , What determines its supply? Are 
government policies called for?, We will discuss these issues in abstract 
and then introduce some illustrative empirical evidence. It turns out 
that despite the limited supply of organization input in underdeveloped 
economies, the required P-factor can usually be supplied from abroad with 
the installation of new capital equipment. The demand for L-factor is 
insignificant: in early stages of development the wage rate is so low that 
wage savings from higher efficiency may not even compensate for the costs 
of organization input. Large efforts to build up domestic organization 
input do not appear to be justified. 
Cultural norm, personality traits, inexperience and level of education 
are among the factors (9) limiting the supply of non-marginal product workers 
in modern sectors of underdeveloped economies. To accommodate the shortage 
of the organization stock, most of the plants were planned, installed and 
set up for operation by foreign capital equipment manufacturers or 
technical assistance teams. Little domestic P-factor is used. As a 
consequence a small organization stock often-runs a relatively large firm. 
This is important because the capacity to generate organization input by 
existing organizations is minimal: they do not have the personnel to 
carry out further technological change or improvement in efficiency by 
themselves. 
The generation of organization input domestically faces another 
handicap because of the large technology gap between the modern sector and 
the traditional sector. The gap presents an enormous advantage to the 
modern sector firms, enabling them to earn a high quasi-rent despite their 
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small organization stock. The absence of a distinct causal relationship 
between organization stock and quasi-rent removes the profit incentive to 
generate new organization Inputs. The situation is often aggravated 
further by monopoly. The technology gap leads to an increasing market 
share for the modern sector firm in its'market area and ultimately to 
monopoly. Threat of foreign competition is eliminated by trade barriers* 
and new domestic entries are barred by the narrowness of the market or 
by political maneuver. In such a vacuum there is no need even to generate 
enough organization input to keep.the organization stock intact. There 
is no pull, no push. 
In a mature economy a significant portion of organization input is 
associated-with the establishment of new firms. We have shown this in 
connection with the small-firm sequence in the last section. The incentive 
is provided by the prospect of earning quasi-rents•and is enhanced by a 
well-developed market for organizations: the stock market. Por many 
organizers of firms .-the motivation comes from their expectation of a 
quasi-rent associated with the technology gap'between the best practice 
technology capital equipment they install and the marginal" technology in 
use by aged firms. The organizers contribute little organization input 
initially: the P-factor input for starting the plant is lent by the 
capital equipment manufacturers. Later on they may generate some L-factor 
to meet the competition. Other organizers are more ambitious. They wish 
to enter into the large firm development sequence. They try to put 
together enough organization stock to generate organization inputs for 
expansion. If they are successful they will be richly rewarded in the 
stock market. Organization is traded in the stock market at a price 
equal to the excess of market valuation of a firm over its net worth. 
The price is based on the capitalized sum of the expected stream of 
18. 
quasi-rent. Since traders have a rather short time horizon and 
discount the future heavily, short term growth performance and high 
profits are very much favored.. This '.stimulates the generation of ' 
organization input. Although most of the organizers do not succeed in 
lifting their firms out of the small firm sequence, their efforts bear 
fruit. 
These considerations must be watered down considerably in an under-
developed economy. The market for organization is either non-existent or 
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paper thin. Opportunities for new entry are limited and new 
organizations have little incentive to build large organization stocks. 
To begin with the low level of purchasing power limits the number of 
industries where a modern enterprise may hope to succeed. In the eligible 
industries the established monopoly or oligopoly has enacted barriers to 
entry that bear little relationship to organization stock. Even when a 
foothold is successfully established by a new firm, the large ready-made 
profit due to the technology gap based on foreign-sUpplied P-factor 
removes incentives to build up an organization stock. 
The limited supply of organization may be illustrated by empirical 
data. V/e will take Nigeria as an example» The deficiency of organization 
stock in Nigeria is brought out by the relative ratio of management, 
professional and clerical personnels (the "non-production workers'1 or 
Leibenstein's "non-marginal product employees") to production Workers in 
industrial establishments. The former is a crude index; of the stock of 
organization, if the quality of organization is disregarded for the time 
being. The latter is an index of firm size. Deficiency of organization 
stock is then reflected by a low "NP/P" ratio. 
Table One presents comparable data for Nigeria and for the IMited 
23 States. In Columns (l) and (2) the number of establishments with 20 
TABLE QUE i COMPOSITION OP LABOR FORCE IN NIGERIA AND IN THE U.S. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I N D U S T R Y 
Meat Products 
Dairy Products 
Grain Mill Products 
Bakery Products 
Sugar Confectionary 
Miscellaneous Pood Preparations 
Beer Brewing 
Soft Drinks 
Textiles 
Footwear 
Wearing Apparel 
ISIC SIC 
CODE CODE 
(Nigeria) (U.S.) 
201 
202 
205 
206 
208 
209, 220 
213 
214 
231, 232 
241 
243 
201 
202 
204 
205 
2071 
209 
2082 
2086 
22 
314 
23 
No. of establishments with 
20 or more workers/Total 
Number of establishments 
in the sample 
Nigeria 
7/10 
3/4 
2/6 
41/70 
5/6 
9/9 
6/6 
8/13 
32/34 
16/21 
11/15 
U.S. 
2018/5300 
2885/7885 
1088/3555 
2122/5366 
411/1211 
1428/2478 
180/222 
1530/3905 
4368/7104 
912/1193 
13011/28457 
Ratio of Non-
Production workers 
to Production Workers 
Nigeria 
. 26 
'.35 
.34 
.20 
.14 
.37 
.41 
.33 
.11 
.13 
.10 
U.S. 
.26 
1.20 
.43 
.71 
.21 
.51 
.47 
1.59 
.. . 1 1 
.10 
.13 
Ratio of average Non-Productioi 
worker renumeration to average 
production worker renumeration 
Nigeria 
4.8 
3.6 
5.1 
2.5 
5.6 
3.5 
3.5 
4.3 
.5.4 
5.2 
3.3 
U.S. 
1.4 
1.2 
1-3 
1.3 
1.9 
1.5 
1.3/ 
1.5 
2.0 
2.3 
2.1 
I N D U S T R Y ISIC 
CODE 
(Nigeria) 
SIC 
CODE 
(U.S.) 
Saw Milling 251 2421 
Furniture and Fixtures 260 25 
Paper Products 272 264 
Printing 280 275 
Tanning and Travel Goods 291, 293 3111 
Rubber ' 300 3069 
Basic Industrial Chemicals 311 281 
Vegetable Oil Milling 312 2093 
Paints 313 2851 
Miscellaneous Chemicals 319, 321, 329 289 
Bricks and Tiles 331 3251 
Cement 334 324.1 
Concrete Products 339 3273 
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or more employees versus the total number of establishments in the two 
samples are given. The Nigerian sample has in fact a larger proportion 
of "large" establishments in most industries. This implies that the 
Nigerian sample consists mainly of modern rather than traditional 
small-scale establishments. With a few omissions all the industries 
covered in the Nigeria Industrial Survey are included in the table so we 
have a nearly complete picture of modern industries in Nigeria. 
Two results are noteworthy, A comparison of Columns (3) and (4) 
shows that the NP/P ratio is much lower in Nigeria than its counterpart 
in the U. S, for practically all the industries. In addition we may look 
at the last two figures in Column (4). Judging from the U. S. experience, the 
industries with a foothold in Nigeria have a much lower NP/P ratio than 
average. This deficiency in the quantity of organization stock will certainly 
be worsened if the organization quality is also taken into account. At the 
same time the limited supply of organization members is probably also 
responsible for the high renumeration to the non-production workers in 
Nigeria. As demonstrated in Column (5) and (6), the average non-production 
worker in Nigeria earns four times as much as the production worker, while 
the non—production worker in the U.S. earns only twice as much. This 
immediately suggests that it might be difficult in Nigeria to substitute 
organization for labor or to raise labor productivity by greater 
organization input. We now. proceed to look at the question more closely. 
In the first six columns of Table Two the different components of 
value added are given. The first four shares,expressed as a percent of 
value added, are calculated directly from the Nigerian Industrial Survey. 
The fifth column is calculated from capital assets data in the survey on the 
following assumptions : 
(a) the interest charges are 10 per cent of the total capital assets; 
TABLE TWO. PROFIT 
(All share figures expressed 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
I II D U S T R Y Production Non-Production Excise Other costs 
worker 
share 
worker 
share 
tax 
share 
share 
Meat Products .16 .20 .02 .09 
Dairy Products .19 .24 - .09 
Grain Mill Products .04 .07 - -
Bakery Products .14 .07 .05 ,04 
Sugar Confectionary .09 .07 .17 .03 
Miscellaneous Food Preparations .035 .045 .60 .01 
Beer Brewing .03 .07 .42 .02 
Soft Drinks .07 .10 .09 .08 
Textiles .17 .10 .13 .03 
P ootwear .22 .15 .28 .10 
Wearing Apparel .18 .06 .05 .05 
Saw Milling .27 .14 .02 .03 
Furniture & Fixtures .25 .13 .02 c08 
Paper Products .14 .15 - .08 
Printing .36 .32 - .06 
Tanning & Travel Goods .18 .08 .06 .09 
Rubber .20 .12 .10 .02 
Basic Industrial Chemicals .04 .15 - .02 
Vegetable Oil Milling .13 .06 - .25 
Paints .05 .14 .19 .09 
Miscellaneous Chemicals .08 .16 .08 .05 
Bricks and Tiles .20 .25 - .05 
C ement .09 .06 .08 .02 
Concrete Products .18 .20 - .10 
Basic Metals .17 .25 - -
Metal Products .17 .13 .08 .06 
Electrical Equipment .09 .19 - .12 
Average .145 .137 
* Include rental payments, professional fees, office material; telephone, 
postage, insurances advertising, hired transport and water. 
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(b) book value machinery, equipment and motor vehicles depreciate at 8 
percent per annum; (c) buildings depreciate at 3 percent per annum; 
and (d) the total capital share is the sum of interest charges and 
depreciation charges calculated according to (a), (b) and (c). The 10 
percent interest rate is based on the assumption that modern sector 
investors in Nigeria have access to subsidized capital. The depreciation 
rates are higher than the average figures for the U. S. to reflect poorer 
maintenance,, The estimates are of course quite crude, but an error of 20 or 
30 percent will not affect our conclusions significantly. Finally Column 
(6), the "residual profit share", is the remainder after the five shares 
from Columns (l) to (5) have been subtracted from value added. 
The results are striking. With the exception of four industries a very 
large residual share is left, often in excess of either the capital share or 
the labor share. According to our earlier arguments, this residual share 
has little to do with organization stock; it is mostly associated with the 
technology gap between the modern sector and the traditional sector in 
Nigeria and with monopoly profit. If we make some fairly realistic 
assumptions, it is possible to estimate the general magnitude of these two 
components. The necessary assumptions are : 
(1) The Nigerian economy consists of a modern sector and a traditional 
s ector. 
(2) In Nigeria the wage rates in the modern sector and the traditional 
sector are the same and are determined by the marginal productivity of 
labor in the traditional sector. Marginal productivity of labor also 
determines the wage rate in the U. S. 
( 3 ) Each industry in the modem sector in Nigeria employs the same 
mix of capital goods as its U. S. counterpart. 
( 4 ) The labor productivity difference between the U. S. and the 
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Modern sector in Nigeria is explained solely by differences in efficiency. 
For each industry there is an "efficiency multiple" which could be' used to 
convert labor inputs in the two countries to identical efficiency units. 
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(5) The substitution possibility is highly limited. Thus despite 
the large difference in relative factor prices5 the same labor (measured in 
efficiency units) and capital combination are used to produce a given sum 
of value, added in the modem sector in Nigeria as in the U.S. 
(6) Technological advance is labor saving. The technology gap between 
the modern sector and the traditional sector (for an industry) is reflected 
by differences in marginal productivity of labor in the two sectors. 
(?) Quasi-rent based on organization differential is irrelevant. Hence 
for each industry a single efficiency multiple may be used? and the residual 
share is attributable to technology gap and monopoly. 
Under these assumptions it follows immediately that the technology gap 
between the modern sector and the traditional sector in Nigeria is measured 
by the wage share difference between the U. S. and Nigeria. Let us define : 
MPjj. rj,: marginal productivity of labor in the traditional sector of Nigeria. 
MPjj. gj.: marginal productivity of labor in the modern sector of Nigeria. 
HPjj! marginal.-productivity of labor in the U. S. 
t 25 .:. the. efficiency, multiple. 
Now consider the value added produced by one Nigeria production worker in 
some industry in the modern sector. The wage share in this case is, by 
Assumption (2): 
(Wage share)^ffi = M P ^ 
The wage share of the same value added in the U. S. is? also by Assumption (2): 
(Wage share) 
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Prom Assumption (4), 
I€PN,M 
Hence: 
- MPjj T = (wage share )u - (wage • share 
By Assumption (6) we conclude the wage share difference "measures" the effect 
of the technology gap. To put it in another way, the v/age share difference 
represents exploitation by the user of modern technology. Despite the 
higher marginal product of production workers they are paid the wage in the 
traditional sector. Since capital user costs are approximately equal in the 
modern sector of Nigeria and in the U. S., the wage share difference is the 
profit reaped from the technology gap. If the modern sector pays a higher 
wage than the traditional sector,, the wage share difference then understates 
the technology gap. 
Column (9) in Table Two shows that technology gap on the average accounts 
for more than one-half of the residual share. Under our assumptions the 
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remainder is attributed to monopoly profit based on monopoly pricing. 
Practically the distinction of the two types of profits is of some 
significance. Investment in industries with large technology gap raises the 
general level of productivity in the country while' investment in industries 
with high monopoly profit provides meager social benefit. A quantitative 
estimate of the two components such as we have just attempted is 
therefore useful for policy making in investment allocation, taxation and 
tariffs. 
Using Nigeria as an example, we have now verified our earlier argument 
that firms in underdeveloped countries enjoy high profits from technology gap and 27 
from monopoly. The high profits undermine the incentive to generate 
organization input. To illustrate, let the target efficiency for a firm 
be the level of labor efficiency in the U.S. Assuming other firms in the 
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industry remain behind without progress, the quasi-rent resulting from 
the burst of organization input is calculated by multiplying the production 
worker share in Column (l) of Table Two by 1 )/<*(, where is the 
efficiency multiple given in Column (ll). Results of the calculation are 
given in Column (12). Evidently the quasi-rent under such optimal 
circumstances is still 'small relative to the residual share already accrued 
to the firm. Actually the crucial point is that the generation of 
organization input may not be efficient at all if the generation implies a 
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substitution of non-production workers for production workers. If a 
doubling of non-production workers is needed to accomplish the higher 
efficiency, for example, the quasi-rent from wage saving will be more than 
wiped out by the increase in the share-of non-production workers. The wage 
rate is simply too low for wage saving to be worthwhile and non-production 
workers too expensive (and perhaps too ineffective as well) to be employed 
for the replacement of production workers. 
Generation of organization input is therefore an efficient step only 
in a late stage of economic development. Before this stage is reached 
exploitation of the technology gap provides a more attractive option. large 
increase in productivity is- available, and it can be accomplished with mostly 
P-factors provided from foreign countries. This option is made still more 
attractive if capital is available.at subsidized rates. There is also some 
empirical evidence that this is indeed the path followed by the under-
developed countries. There are frequent comments (for example, see (2)) 
on their use of capital intensive modern technology despite the low wage 
rates. As time goes on the rise in productivity increases the level of 
purchasing power and widens the market. Monopoly profits, hopefully with an 
assistance from the government, will; start to lose their importance. The 
option of exploiting the technology gap also-vanishes gradually. It then 
becomes more Important to earn a quasi-rent by cultivating organization 
inputs. At the same time the wage rate is higher and the supply of effective 
organization members is greater, A substitution of organization of labor 
becomes meaningful, intimately the economy matures and the point of. • 
reference turns to the small-firm and large-firm sequences discussed in the 
last section. In short, our conclusion is negative. Generally speaking 
the organization supply is minimal in underdeveloped countries and' there 
is little economic justification for building up a supply,by arbitrary means. 
IV 
Our discussion in.the last section deals with the domestic supply of 
organization input In underdeveloped countries. Another option is available: 
the importation of organization input from countries possessing rich 
accumulations of organization stock. An important distinction should be 
drawn here. The direct importation of organization input is usually 
advantageous because such organization input is often a free good or could 
be generated at low marginal costs in the exporting country. Cine such 
example is management know-how in the form of book knowledge. Another 
example already elaborated on in the last section is the P-factor 
input supplied by manufacturers of capital, equipments. In contrast, 
organization input may also be imported indirectly by the importation of 
organization stock. The stock then generates organization inputs in the 
host country. When the stock is fully integrated in the form of a firm by 
a "super-organization" in the exporting country, we have the case of a 
29 .. - -multinational firm. The imported firm is in a position to earn quasi-rents 
and monopoly profits in .the same way as the domestic firms. The net benefit 
to the importing country is by no means obvious, and will be the subject of 
our analysis in the present section. 
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The multinational firm has been described (21, P.82) as "a business 
organization that is engaged in production in a number of countries 
through branches, subsidiaries or affiliates, which may or may not be 
separate entities in the several countries in which they operate. The 
term 'organization1 implies that the entire group., including the head office 
as well as various types of subsidiary units, is operated within an 
administrative framework which knits the whole together in such.a way. so 
that the general policies and administrative and financial.procedure of the 
group are reasonably consistent and coherent throughout.the firm." 
Organization stands out as the distinctive feature of the multinational 
firm.' A multinational firm usually implies also direct capital investment 
and foreign ownership, but what sets it apart is the fact that the. entry of 
the firm into a country brings with it an importation of organization stock. 
To highlight this we will leave aside several issues in which-discussions 
on multinational firms are often emboiled: gains and losses from foreign 
capital investment, effects on balance of payments, political influence 
and nationalism. 
The multinational firm is ordinarily a "multi-divisional firm" and we 
may be guided by Williamson's excellent analysis (25) of this type of 
firm. Its standard feature is a division of labor between the. general office 
and the divisions, after the firm has reached a size where direct supervision-
by the chief executive over the various divisions of the firm becomes 
ineffective. The general office Is principally concerned with startegic 
decisions involving planning, appraisal, control and the allocation of 
resources among the competing operational divisions. It is committed to 
the overall performance of the firm. Each division under the general office 
is responsible for its operation. The advantages of this structure derive 
mostly from the presence of an independent elite staff and from the 
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restoration of the integrity to the goal-specification process away 
from the squabbles and influences of divisional executive preoccupied-, with 
their vested interests. 
The multinational firm therefore appears to contribute towards the 
rational allocation of world resources: a supra-national arrangement by 
which capital and organization resources both flow to countries where 
profit is the highest. But what determines profit? In underdeveloped 
countries profits are found in areas where quasi-rent from technology gap 
and monopoly profits are high. A multinational firm may bring with it a 
highly efficient organization, but efficiency or organization demand is not 
the main criterion used by the firm. Efficient organization may actually be 
wasted if wage is so low that wage saving is unimportant. 
The case against the multinational firm from the point of view of the 
underdeveloped country goes beyond this. The frame of. reference for the 
multinational firm differs from the domestic firm. The supply of 
organization stock by the multinational firm hinges on the profitability 
comparison for a cross section of the countries. The multinational firm 
also has a mobility unmatched by national firms. It can withhold further 
expansion or even withdraw its organization investment in a country if 
profitability falls. Consequently a multinational firm may pull out of a,. 
country when her growth hits a snarl just at a time when its • 
contribution to economic development is most needed. 
The multinational firm may also stifle the growth of domestic 
organization stock. Drawing on its experience and vast resources, the 
superior organization stock possessed by the multinational firm gives the 
firm a competitive edge. The firm chooses the most profitable industry 
for its entry, and then drives off the domestic competitors.- Domestic 
firms are left with the less profitable opportunities. Since large 
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profit is often needed to overcome the inertia and the cultural trap and to 
offset the disadvantage of initial inexperience, fewer domestic organization 
will he formed. 
Finally the cost of the organization stock provided by a multinational 
firm is also higher than that of a domestic firm. Ixl the first place, the 
opportunity cost of the former is high because the multinational firm can 
choose to invest its organization stock among a larger set of opportunities 
in many different nations. The multinational firm is also likely to 
discount heavily the expected profits in the underdeveloped countries 
because of political instability and nationalism. In addition the 
expatriates sent by the multinational firm have to be compensated for 
their relocation with extra remuneration, and such costs must be deducted 
from the profits. In the long-run, therefore, domestic supply of 
organization stock will turn out to be cheaper provided the multinational 
firms have not established a stranglehold. 
A rather different picture emerges if the multinational firm is given 
onls^  a temporary stay in an underdeveloped country. Sometimes the 
technology of an industry is so complex that P-factor input supplied by 
the capital goods manufacturers is insufficient for the continuous 
operation of the firm. Alternatively some technology is not public 
knowledge and can be employed only with the import of an accompanying 
organization stock. Under these circumstances It is both necessary and 
often desirable to allow the temporary stay of a multinational firm 
until domestic personnels and capital have been built up to take it over. 
The advantage of this strategy Is that the new technology is transmitted 
at a minimum cost. In addition, when the expatriate management team 
departs they leave behind often at no costs at all — - a tested 
organization structure with established codes, rules, and channels of 
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decision and information flow, lb implement this strategy the 
multinational firms must be obligated to undertake training responsibilities. 
If the technology gap and monopoly profit are insufficient to induce the 
multinational firm to offer a temporary commitment, the use of foreign 
management teams, consulting service or training missions might also 
serve the same purposes. 
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According to March and Simon (17), organizations are "assemblages 
of interacting human beings" and are'characterized by "specificity 
in role, in channel and context of communication". 
Kaldor (lo) had pointed out: "The function which lends uniqueness and 
determinateness to the firm the ability to adjust, to co-ordinate 
is an essentially dynamic function; It is only required so long 
as adjustments are required; and the extent to which it Is required 
depends on the frequency and the magnitude of the adjustment to be 
undertaken." 
The owners of the firm are also owners of its organization so long 
as they are legally entitled to the decision on the disposal of 
organization. Because of the close complementarity betweeji prganization 
and capital eajrnijigs they are usually also the. owners of the capital. stock. 
"The strong commitments of individuals in interpersonal relations 
that are of intrinsic importance to them tend to make the. continuation 
of the association a supreme value" ( 4 ) . 
Since growth almost inevitably involves technological change, the two 
are combined in our subsequent analysis. Substitution between capital 
and labor with given technology is left out because we have found it 
(24) to be of limited quantitative significance. 
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are generally regarded as alternative options. As de leeuw had 
reported (6), firms consider depreciation allowance and savings 
from net profit as a single fund, to be used for replacement and 
expansion alike. The ratio of average post-war level of depreciation 
to net capital addition in manufacturing in the U. S. was 2.357. 
16. Let the rate of expansion be P, and use the notations of Footnotes 
9 and 10. Then concentrating on the impact of expansion on 
technology index: 
D T e = T 2 - ^ 
1 + p. 
= ^ (T*-^) 
(1 
If f= (l-sO, the rate of replacement in Footnote 9, then: 
e - 1 - A (T* - T) DT _ 2 
Since 0 1, DT ( = _1 d!T ) is less than DT . 8 2 r r 
17. As the expression for DT^ in the last foot note shows, for given 
p , DTg is smaller if the value of (T*-^) is lower. At the limit 
the plant attains T* and its DT equals to DT* if its rate of 
expansion is infinite. 
18. For every firm: 
DT = T2 - = DT* = CT 
DE = E2 - El = C E 
where C„ and C 
T E are exogeneously determined constants because the 
relative efficiency positions of the firms are assumed to be 
constant. It follows that: 
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DZ - Z2 - Z1 
= w W 
= CTCE + + ¥ E 
Firms with high efficiency (E^ and advanced technology (l^) 
initially will have a higher value of DZ. 
19. If we assume that firms will attempt to improve their X-efficiency 
so that their overall cost positions relative to each other remain 
the same, then DZ is a constant (Cz) for all firms: 
DZ = C z = C t ( E 2 - Ej_) + E ^ + E l ( E 2 - E^) 
Here as before — - we assume that DT is a constant (as we have 
concluded from out? model). Hence we have: 
E 2 - e l = (C z - EL .cT ) / (eT + •el>- ' 
High efficiency and advanced technology initially result in lower 
X-efficiency improvement. 
20. The exit rate is associated with technology level. Of the "very 
advanced technology" plants in 1935 42 percent had exited by 1959, 
while of the "very backward" plants 79 percent had exited (22, p. 99). 
21. In contrast, most of the literature on organization theory and on 
behavior theory of the firm applies to large firms, where organization 
does occupy an important place. 
22. To take Kenya Stock Exchange as an example, In a 14 week period in 
1966 only 44 of the 84 listed stocks v/ere traded and 21 of these 
were traded in three or less weeks in this period. See (14). 
23. The U. S. data are based on 1963 Census of Manufactures. Nigeria 
data are based on Nigeria Federal Office of Statistics: Industrial 
Survey, 1964-5. 
24. Since there are different technologies the marginal productivity 
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of labor is defined despite the limited substitution possibilities. 
25. In practice is computed by dividing the average productivity 
of labor in the U. S. by the average productivity of labor in 
Figerias with value-added as the numerator in the productivity 
calculation. The results are given in Column (ll) of Table Two. 
2 6. Monopoly pricing is possible despite the co-existence of a modern 
sector and a traditional sector because the market is segmented. 
Transportation difficulties and product differentiation are the 
principal causes of the segmentation. 
27. There are of course many exceptions (7). Overcapacity due to bad 
planning; input shortage and other bottlenecks appears to be the 
chief reason for lo?/ profits or even losses. 
28. A fair correlation (rank correlation coefficients of 0.74 and 0.67) -
was found by Delahanty (5) between, changes in EP/P ratio and changes 
in production worker productivity in different industries in the 
U.S. 
29. If the imported organization stock is not fully integrated we have 
the intermediate case of contracted management teams or consultants. 
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